An In-Depth Look at the Collapse of Georgia’s Manganese Industry and a Ukrainian Oligarch’s Global History of Crimes
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The Georgian manganese industry is a cornerstone of the country’s exportation. It risks collapsing following the 2025 mass closure of mines by the monopolistic company, Georgian Manganese (GM). This action left over 5,400 miners unemployed and sparked desperate protests, including hunger strikes. While the company claimed its bankruptcy, the article will reveal its long history of labor exploitation, environmental damage, and suspicious incomes; these are all shielded by the company’s powerful protectors. This article, after careful research, will confirm that GM is controlled by Georgian American Alloys (GAA), a company owned by the Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi. Grasping opportunities in late Soviet society, he initiates his international empire, Privat Group, through political collusion, media control, intimidation, and using his Privat Bank to launder billions of dollars out of Ukraine.
Kolomoyskyi falls after he lost his key political influence in Ukraine, leading to the nationalization of his bank, which rendered a $5.5 billion fraud, in 2016. Despite his previous use for the West in Ukraine’s “color revolutions,” he was subsequently international investigated and arrested in Ukraine in 2023 on charges including treason. This fall has thrown the Georgian manganese industry into a chaotic struggle between international capitalists seeking to claim his assets, the Ukrainian government, and the Georgian government cautiously seeking control. In this geopolitical battle, the miners remain the primary victims. Their fight for survival remains invisible as their sacrifice are concealed by the discourse framing the dismantling of Kolomoyskyi’s empire as the victory of law.
Current State of the Georgian Manganese Industry
In Georgia, ferroalloys, including manganese, are among the country’s main export products, affecting the living of hundreds of thousands of people. From 2012 to 2023, Georgia exported $3.8 billion worth of ferroalloys, mostly as primary goods, namely raw materials. Since 2021, Georgia’s exportation of manganese dioxide to Russia quintupled. Georgian Manganese is the country’s only, monopolizing enterprise producing this substance.
However, the conflicts between Georgian Manganese and its workers have long been intensified. In 2023, miners protested against severe working conditions and income gaps. They expressed discontent for feeding on buckwheat, fish and bread. The protests ended up in a 12% pay increase and an agreement to address production-quota issues. Here I shall underline that income is indexed in inflation; rising salary not necessarily guarantees the enhancement of workers’ purchasing power, and thus of their living condition. By December, protests burst again due to minimum 12-hour working days without commensurate pay. Laborers and their employers agreed to set the same hourly rate for the 8-hour and 12-hour shifts.
In early 2025, Georgian Manganese claimed operational loss, announced a restructuring, and halted most underground mining, leaving at least 5,400 workers unemployed. In fact, the company had already suspended all production in November 2024. According to the contract, workers were entitled to receive 60 percent of their original salary when forced to cease production. The company, however, ignored this obligation.
What’s more, it is highly questionable whether the company truly confronts bankruptcy and insolvency. Georgian Manganese dominates Georgia’s ferroalloy industry and almost monopolizes the country’s manganese-ore production. This largely benefits from GM’s 40-year mining license covering 16,430 hectares of land. By law, the company must file annual financial statements, including a balance sheet, yet it refuses to comply. The management prefer repeatedly paying tens of thousands in fines to publicly disclosing its assets and liabilities. The company has also established 12 subsidiaries and held their share. Most of these subsidiaries witness annual profit growth.
Local media alleged that some forces were clearly protecting Georgian Manganese from legal sanctions. For example, between 2013 and 2017 the company was fined 416 million Lari (GEL) for environmental damage. However, in subsequent years, the penalties drastically declined. With no evident practical improvement of the company, the fine kept decreasing to merely 950 Lari from 2018 to 2020.
Based on these observations, I ask, who is the powerful protecter that enables GM to flout the law and avoid penalties worthing hundreds of millions of Lari? According to the author’s research, since 2013, Georgian Manganese was acquired by in 2013 by Georgian American Alloys (GAA) and has since then remained under GAA’s nominal control.
Criminal History of a Typical Ukrainian Oligarch’s Rise to Fortune
The so-called Georgian American Alloys (GAA), in fact, has little connection to the American capital. The GAA is controlled by the Privat Group, led by the Israeli-Ukrainian oligarch, Ihor Kolomoyskyi. He grasped structural loopholes in late Soviet society, then gradually extended control over key industries domestically and abroad. For years he transferred considerable Ukrainian wealth to Western Europe and the United States, ending up in prison.
<https://kyivindependent.com/kolomoisky-privatbank/>
As the Soviet Union dissolute, Kolomoyskyi, in his twenties and thirties, made his first fortune from the disco boom. Through official—business collusion and opportunistic speculation, he entered the fuel trade. Later, he secured a barter agreement with the Ordzhonikidze ore processing plant to obtain ore, extending his business into the ferroalloy trade. Meanwhile, he rapidly expanded his property through back-channel deals.
In 1992, as Kolomoyskyi’s ventures in Ukraine began to take shape. A former bureaucrat proposed to his partners to establish a private commercial bank. Kolomoyskyi agreed.The bank project proceeded swiftly. In March of that year, four firms closely connected to Kolomoyskyi jointly founded Privat Bank, whose stated mission was “to serve private entrepreneurs at home and abroad.” In reality, Privat Bank became a venue for collusive deals and the sell-off of Ukrainian state assets, immediately favored by pro-Western liberal bureaucrats. Kolomoyskyi subsequently consolidated his resources and formed the Privat Group, a conglomerate infiltrating diverse industries with Privat Bank as its core.
As the Privat Group continues to run in 1993, Kolomoyskyi was strongly supported by the then-Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma and the National Bank of Ukraine Kolomoyskyi became the only Ukrainian at the time who can establish overseas loan business. As a result, international payment systems integrate Privat Bank. The bank was admitted as a full member of multiple international networks, and accommodated tens of thousands of employees. The international payment systems were willing to welcome Kolomoyskyi because they saw his potential to help international capital enter Ukraine.
In 1994, Kolomoyskyi intervened in politics. As part of a coordinated agenda with Leonid Kuchma, he mobilized extensive resources and connections to help Kuchma’s presidential campaign, which was a success. After Kuchma came to power, his economic policy practices full privatization. During his term, dozens of oligarchs became the new owners of state-owned industries. Plus, foreign capital and “aid” poured into Ukraine, and the regime tilted decisively toward the U.S. and the West.
After 1995, the sell-off of state assets further intensified, and the Privat Group was deeply involved in this process. By 2003, the group controlled the Ukrainian oil company (Ukrnafta), the Kalinin Plant, the Ozerka market in Dnipropetrovsk, and numerous other industries. Kolomoyskyi resorted to beatings, assassinations, keeping a shark in his office for intimidation, and armed threats to force dissenters into submission. The dissolution of the shareholders’ meeting of the Dniprospetsstal (Dnipro Special Steel) plant serves as evidence.
Concurrent with his political involvement, Kolomoyskyi bought over a large number of Ukrainian media outlets, turning them into allies for Privat’s interests to reshape public opinion. This situation at least lasted until 2016. Kolomoyskyi exerted control over national media such as the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (UNIAN), Ukrayinska Pravda, and Kommersant-Ukraine. He possessed a semi-monopolistic investigative capability within the private sector, with many former intelligence officials and ex-agents working for him.
Kolomoyskyi was keen on controlling the media not only to manipulate elections, but also because he was in fierce competition with several other well-known oligarchs. In 2008, the Kyiv Post commented that the competition among oligarchs had put the country in a “state of war.” Corporate ownership changed constantly, mid- and senior-level employees were repeatedly purged, cash flows and supply chains grew unstable, and large shares of production fell into disorder. The nation’s pillar industries turned out the most affected.
A classic case was the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant dispute, a linchpin asset in Ukrainian and even global ferroalloys. The conflicts between Privat Group against Viktor Pinchuk’s Interpipe Group persisted over a decade. Both sides weaponized the media to excavate and fabricate scandals, causing chaos in the public sphere. The public space has been flooded with information of low credibility and tasteless, foul commentary. Pinchuk even paid music channels to air jokes about Kolomoyskyi. At that time, a student interning in the media wrote in an article: “ordinary people communicate with each other by phone, while Ukrainian billionaires acquire television stations to protect themselves. This is the rule for big business in Ukraine.” The media, once a public channel of information and opinion, had devolved into a private intercom for the rich.
The Nikopol dispute results in the victory of Kolomoyskyi. Correspondingly, Privat completed its domination over the core sector of Ukraine’s mining and metallurgy industry. This paved its way for later incursions into key industries abroad. Kolomoyskyi’s factories routinely evaded taxes, filed falsified reports with regulators, and exports products to Europe in prices lower than the cost. This generated at least billions of illicit revenues. By the 2010s, Kolomoyskyi was firmly ranked among the top three richest individuals in Ukraine, with a publicly declared private fortune of $7 billion. Not to mention the invisible power that came with his political influence.
Political Career of an Oligarch
In 2010, Kolomoyskyi, who also held an Israeli citizenship, was appointed president of the European Council of Jewish Communities (ECJC) after pledging a donation of US$14 million. However, the established Jewish magnates and politicians of Western Europe looked down on him as a nouveau riche. They commented that he embodied a “Soviet Style.” They said his time as an oligarch in Ukraine had made him adept at “takeovers” and “coups.” In short, he was unpopular in the Western European Jewish community and was unable to gain more political capital. Amid protests in 2011, Kolomoyskyi resigned from the council.
While Kolomoyskyi faced great difficulty in expanding his political influence abroad, his made smooth political progress in Ukraine. He actively and extensively participated in two U.S.-supported “color revolutions” in Ukraine. The first was the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, when Kolomoyskyi supported the pro-American presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko. This individual had previously served as the governor of the National Bank of Ukraine and was one of the key figures in the privatization process and cooperation with Privat Bank.
Kolomoyskyi generously funded Yushchenko’s campaign, and his media outlets were instructed to assist as well. The election happened twice, and Yushchenko failed in both times. The United States could not tolerate this and, under the banner of electoral fraud, began to mobilize for a re-run. Protesters surrounded the presidential office, and eventually, the government held a new vote under public pressure. In the third election, Yushchenko won by a narrow margin. In the “revolution,” Kolomoyskyi was the central contributor. His financial assistance, media mobilization, and outreach to the U.S. and the West for support helped lay the foundation for Yushchenko’s win.
The second “color revolution” took place in 2014. Before this, the pro-Russian president Yanukovych focused on strengthening cooperative ties with Russia. This aroused dissatisfaction in west Ukraine regions, the U.S. and the West. As ethnic tensions escalating to the edge of civil war, the U.S. and the West mobilized for a subversion— protesters occupied key sites in Kyiv, and Yanukovych soon compromised and became overthrown.
As soon as acting president Turchynov took office, he appointed Kolomoyskyi as the governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. His business partner, Ihor Palytsia, was also appointed as the governor of Odesa Oblast. At the time, both regions were experiencing severe pro-Russian movements. Kolomoyskyi demonstrated a radical pro-Ukrainian stance. He said, “I don’t understand why Russians and Ukrainians are fighting,” and also derided Putin as “short” and “schizophrenic.” He not only offered bounties for the capture of pro-Russian militants and parliamentarians but also spent tens of millions to form private militias.
At the same time, he financed the infamous Azov Brigade. Thousands of Privat employees helped conduct suppression as well.After the political situation partly stabilized, the new president was Poroshenko. Kolomoyskyi had previous conflicts with him over the control of the state-owned oil pipeline. In 2015, Poroshenko removed Kolomoyskyi from his governor position. Afterwards, Kolomoyskyi frequently acts overseas.
In 2019, Kolomoyskyi supported Zelenskyy’s presidential campaign. Zelenskyy traveled abroad multiple times to meet with him, ad appointed his lawyer as a key advisor. Not surprisingly, Kolomoyskyi’s media empire worked to build a supportive atmosphere for Zelenskyy.In exchange, Zelenskyy dismissed numerous officials who opposing Kolomoyskyi after winning the election.
An International Capital Empire and Capital Flight
As Kolomoyskyi and Privat Group became one of the most influential forces in Ukraine, they become more alert to cope with the ever-changing political situation. The Privat Group extended its reach into the aviation industry as the first step in moving its assets abroad. This proved that Privat was an indisputable puppet of the U.S. and the West.
In the early 2000s, Kolomoyskyi controlled six airlines, either domestic or international, all of which went bankrupt in the 2010s. The details of these bankruptcies are telling. At least four of the six companies went bankrupt because they could not repay their loans, yet all of these loans came from Privat Bank. The facts are obvious— Kolomoyskyi transferred large amounts of Ukrainian assets overseas by transferring some of his business into his others of his own. Thereby, he evaded potential audits through bankruptcies and fraudulent accounting. Examinations about these would never happen under such politically manipulated system.
Privat Bank was also deeply involved in offshoring assets. Over more than a decade, the bank misappropriated billions of dollars illegally. These transfers often concealed the true beneficiaries through complex financial maneuvers. Its Cyprus branch engaged in long-term offshore money laundering. According to a report, from 2006 to 2016, the branch was suspected of non-compliant fund flows totaling as much as $47 billion. Although the report’s figures may be exaggerated, it still reflects the immense scale of its operations.The largest known instance of money laundering was exposed in 2019, involving $1 billion. These assets originated from loan fraud in Ukraine and entered the United States through a series of laundering schemes. The assets were ultimately confiscated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Kolomoyskyi used these offshore assets to purchase numerous properties abroad. He owned several commercial buildings in Cleveland, USA, as well as a luxury hotel with 484 rooms, controlling a total of 5 million square feet of real estate. These investments often resulted in abandoned properties, unpaid taxes, and local economic decline. Also, Kolomoyskyi possessed several property management companies in London. In France, the government seized a one-hectare villa and a 50-acre estate from him, along with boats and a private jet.
Furthermore, Kolomoyskyi held far more than just some showpiece properties; he also went on to control the core industries in multiple countries. In the United States, he controlled many of ferroalloy industries, such as the Felman Production plant in West Virginia, at one point accounting for over 50% of the US production of silicomanganese. Many of his factories were known for safety accidents, bankruptcies, and worker layoffs. In Australia, he controlled Consolidated Minerals, which accounted for 10% of the global manganese ore production. Similar patterns existed in countries such as Romania, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Ghana, which I will not unpack in detail.
Kolomoyskyi’s media outlets touted his plan to “rebuild the Soviet-era supply chain.” This was no empty claim; at his peak, if his production facilities were running at full capacity, they would have accounted for 30% to 40% of the world’s manganese alloy production.The largest overseas stronghold of Kolomoyskyi’s capital empire was the Georgian manganese industry introduced previously.
This is evident from a background investigation of Georgian Manganese’s senior management. Aside from members with local Georgian backgrounds, many personnel worked closely with European and American institutions. For example, Giga Khvichia, the head of Georgian Manganese’s labor safety department, previously worked for the notorious USAID, as well as the World Bank and British Petroleum (BP). Tamar Khurtsia, head of the company’s media department, has worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Mariam Kutateladze is the Human Resources Director. Based on her resume, it can be inferred that she has at least a decade of professional experience in the UK. Sandro Khevdeliani, head of the commercial department, also has a background managing international projects for British Petroleum.
From labor relations to company image, from personnel management to the distribution of gains of the labor, nothing is in the hands of Georgians themselves. This crystalizes that today’s Georgian manganese industry is controlled by international capital.
The Oligarch’s Downfall
Kolomoyskyi’s downfall began in 2015. After he was removed from his post as governor, the domestic political atmosphere in Ukraine became detrimental to him. The more Kolomoyskyi spent time abroad, the more financial scandals emerge. Italy shut down PrivatBank’s local operations and publicly disclosed some of the bank’s illegal activities.
In December 2016, Poroshenko announced that Privat Bank was suspected of criminal activity and was severely undercapitalized. He proceeded to nationalize it. The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) quickly uncovered that Privat Bank engaged in coordinated crime, causing Ukraine’s losses, equivalent to “33% of residents’ deposits… and 40% of the monetary base”. Even the stated capital shortfall amounted to $5.5 billion.
Meanwhile, Kolomoyskyi retained numerous industries in the U.S. and the West. Some of the companies he acquired even ceased production. They simply waited for the prices of related products to rise before being sold off to let Kolomoyskyi to profit from the price difference. The U.S. and the West tolerated his scandals and speculative destruction of many industries. It was based on his value in helping the colonialization of Ukraine. However, with Poroshenko’s nationalization of the bank, Kolomoyskyi lost his key tool to intervene in the Ukrainian politics. It was now time that he would be abandoned and liquidated by the U.S. and the West.
In 2018, a British court took the first step, announcing a trial on Privat’s activities in the UK. Soon after, the FBI also began its investigation into Privat, confiscating $7.5 billion in money laundering proceeds and $5.5 billion from fraudulent loans. The U.S. and the West joined forces and began to “harvest” Privat’s industries. On September 2, 2023, Ukraine, in the midst of a full-scale war, took further action. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) arrested Kolomoyskyi for economic crimes, and later escalated the trial to include charges of treason and financing terrorism. Currently, Kolomoyskyi remains in custody, has not been sentenced, and his bail is set as high as $100 million.
Epilogue: In the Eye of the Storm — The Future of the Georgian Manganese Industry
Let us return to Georgia and its dangerous mines.
The disintegration of Kolomoyskyi’s capital empire did not bring a new dawn to the Georgian manganese industry. Rather, it originated chaos and collapse caused by ownership disputes and broken external funding chains. As for where the future of the Georgian manganese industry lies, the author cannot see it clearly. What is certain is that the global bourgeoisie’s liquidation of Kolomoyskyi’s assets is still ongoing, and the Georgian manganese industry is on the eve of a storm.
Given the extremely complex liquidation procedures for international capital and their execution relying heavily on local authorities, the attitude of the Georgian government centrally influences the future of Georgian Manganese. Kolomoyskyi has been arrested and unfree, and the UK, US, and Ukraine have all begun liquidating his assets within their territories. Anyhow, he has not been convicted. Furthermore, Georgian Manganese and GAA have not been explicitly accused of involvement in international issues. As a result, a bizarre balance has formed over the company’s ownership during all involved parties’ secret calculations.
For the British and American international bourgeoisie, controlling the Georgian manganese industry would amplify their influence in the global market. Besides, such control sets more advantage for their financial speculation, resource monopolization, or influencing Georgian politics. Yet in this case, making a direct takeover is difficult because the bourgeoise are constrained by procedural barriers, normative justifications, and economics.
For the Ukrainian comprador government, the state treasury could potentially get a share of the spoils from the Kolomoyskyi empire’s corpse. It is because Kolomoyskyi is in custody and unable to influence the situation, similar to the condition for the nationalization of Privat Bank. Kolomoyskyi is an important bargaining chip for the current Ukrainian regime. The regime is unwilling to act abruptly in face of these complex procedures until they ensure that Kolomoyskyi can be leveraged to obtain more support from the U.S. and the West,
The situation facing the Georgian government is even more complicated. On one hand, miners and pro-Russian forces continuously pressures the government, demanding the nationalization of the manganese industry. On the other hand, Georgia lacks non-governmental domestic capital that is strong enough to completely take over Georgian Manganese. That said, nationalization is the only path to bringing GM under national control. This agenda, however, would inevitably confront strong protests from the U.S. and the West, particularly from the Ukrainian authorities. It’d be an unpleasant experience for Georgia, as Stalin’s homeland, to be accused of “violating bourgeois legal rights”.
Moreover, the war situation between Russia and Ukraine remains highly uncertain. The decision to nationalize Georgian Manganese is effectively a decision on whether to lean further towards Russia. The Georgian government is very cautious about this. Georgia’s geographical limitations add to the challenge. Even if the manganese industry were nationalized, its products might be unprofitable in markets outside of Russia due to high transportation costs. Meanwhile, selling large quantities of this strategic resource to Russia would very likely lead to Western sanctions. In the long run, the manganese industry is evolving into a burden imposed upon Georgia by the politics of the capitalist world.
In response, Georgia has opted for a relatively moderate strategy to enhance its influence over the country’s manganese industry. Taking advantage of Kolomoyskyi’s international controversies, the government arranged for its closely affiliated capitalists to negotiate the acquisition of a 4% stake in Georgian Manganese. Manipulating mounting legal accusations of the company, it also appointed an individual with a government background to serve as the company’s “special manager,” thereby intervening in its internal operations. This move intends to strengthen actual control over the manganese industry outside the legal framework, paving the way for future actions.
However, this approach faces multiple risks and structural dilemmas. In the absence of external alternatives or powerful interventions, it is almost impossible for Third World countries to escape the fate of having their core industries colonized. In the case of Georgia’s manganese industry, first, the “special manager,” as the government’s agent in the industry, is highly susceptible to corruption from all sides. The environmental issue is a clear proof. The creation of this position not only failed to solve the pollution problem but instead made it easier for Georgian Manganese to engage in concealment and collusion.
Second, concerning the economic problems mentioned earlier, a more serious structural dilemma commonly found in Third World countries facing U.S. and Western intervention. If resources cannot be consumed domestically, they must be sold abroad. Lacking influence over the international transport industry, sales channels are heavily dependent on the geopolitical environment, and distributing products on the world market becomes difficult. Georgia is a classic example here.
The solution seems clear: extend the industrial chain and produce high-value-added products. However, the production technology and infrastructure required for this path are held in a stranglehold by the U.S. and the West, often subject to blockades or used to expand colonization in the name of “technical assistance.” Thus, this solution barely benefits the Georgian people, regardless of who ultimately wins the struggle for Georgian Manganese.
As the titans of capital wrestle in a labyrinth of ownership, and as various governments weigh the political and economic pros and cons, those bearing the direct brunt at the center of the storm---the Georgian manganese miners---are being pushed into an abyss of despair. The senior management of Georgian Manganese has remained unshaken amidst the turmoil of recent years, faithfully carrying out the orders of the international bourgeoisie to rule the region--- not only nations have civil service systems; international capital does as well.
By July 2025, the struggle of the manganese miners’ union turned more intense and desperate. The workers lived without income, and many families risked being forced into exile. In April, the local government arrested four prominent workers from the protests. To demand the government release their colleagues, the workers began a hunger strike. By July 10th, the hunger strike had entered its 22nd day, and some protesters’ conditions had deteriorated to the point of hospitalization.
The miners repeatedly called on the Georgian national government to intervene, hoping it would resolve the conflict. They also requested the nationalization of the mining industry, but their appeals yielded no significant results. Due to the long-term stigmatization of left-wing movements and the absence of local left-wing political parties, the miners are extremely averse to being labeled as “radicals” or “saboteurs” and oppose the politicization of their protest.
In fact, due to a lack of information and public exposure, a large portion of them do not even know that the capitalist group exploiting them originates from Ukraine. “Our protest is not a sabotage---it is a fight for survival, a fight for dignity,” the miners wrote in a July 5th open letter to Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. “If a person is willing to risk their life for a friend in this struggle, no one can claim such a person is a radical.”
No “white liberal” politicians, aid agencies, or social-safety-net departments are concerned about the miners’ situation and future. Only the populist pro-Russian movement leader, Zurab Makharadze, came to fuel the fire. He told the protesters: “Today, when your leaders say the mining industry should be nationalized, this is actually restoring justice. What belongs to you must be returned to you.” Facing the desperate miners, the U.S. and Western media chose to ignore them, instead promoting the dismantling of Kolomoyskyi’s empire as a great victory for the “rule of law,” “economic order,” and “business ethics.” This is a victory, of course, but it belongs only to the world domination of the U.S. and Western international bourgeoisie.
In the miners’ silent hunger strikes and the cries of their open letter, the price of this “victory” lie bare. It is built on the suffering of the Third World population, exposing the cold essence of the so-called “rules” and “morality” of the capitalist world order. The Georgian manganese industry is a microcosm of the “curse of resources” and the fate of a people under the logic of global capitalism. Perhaps the silence and the cries deep under the mine will become the sharpest query penetrating into this “victory.”